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Abstract—The notion of Integrated Modular Avionics (IMA)
refers to inter-connected pieces of avionics equipment sup-
ported by a wired technology, with stringent reliability and
safety requirements. If the inter-connecting wires are physically
secured so that a malicious user cannot access them directly,
then this enforces (at least partially) the security of the net-
work. However, substituting the wired network with a wireless
network - which in this context is referred to as an Avionics
Wireless Network (AWN) - brings a number of new challenges
related to assurance, reliability, and security. The AWN thus
has to ensure that it provides at least the required security
and safety levels offered by the equivalent wired network.
Providing a wired-equivalent security for a communication
channel requires the setting up of a strong, secure (encrypted)
channel between the entities that are connected to the AWN.
In this paper, we propose three approaches to establish such
a secure channel based on (i) pre-shared keys, (ii) trusted key
distribution, and (iii) key-sharing protocols. For each of these
approaches, we present at least two representative protocol
variants. These protocols are then implemented as part of a
demo AWN and they are then compared based on performance
measurements. Most importantly, we have evaluated these
protocols based on security and operational requirements that
we define in this paper for an AWN.
1. Introduction
In today’s aircraft, Aircraft Data Networks (ADNs) –
highly reliable, efficient and fault-tolerant distributed (real-
time) networks – interconnect a large number of avion-
ics sub-systems, enabling data and network management
commands (control messages) to be exchanged within a
predefined and deterministic time frame. These ADNs have
to cater for a number of sub-systems with both critical and
non-critical functions. Building a network that efficiently
manages these two functions, while still providing a fully
deterministic network with guaranteed bandwidth and Qual-
ity of Service (QoS), is extremely challenging [1].
These ADNs are basically wired networks that connect
multiple devices using a physical connection. Examples of
such networks include ARINC 825 [2], ARINC 664/AFDX
(Avionics Full DupleX Switched Ethernet) [3, 4] and stan-
dard Ethernet. The wiring of these network cables requires
an extensive design-time configuration of the aircraft, mak-
ing post adaptation less flexible, not to mention the potential
of wires being eroded and the problem of additional weight.
In addition, the network redundancy is based on dissimi-
lar paths, not dissimilar mediums of communication, even
though the latter is known to be a better solution.
For these reasons, potentially, for non-critical functions
of an aircraft a wired link between two communication
points can be replaced with a wireless communication
medium. Such a network is referred to as an Avionics
Wireless Network (AWN). The potential for wireless com-
munication in the AWN to be eavesdropped and/or mod-
ified is comparatively higher than for an ADN. For this
reason, all communication between wireless nodes (pieces
of equipment) in an AWN should be encrypted. To achieve
such secure communication (via encryption), AWN nodes
have to establish secure channels between each other, by
running a secure channel protocol. In this paper, we have
selected seven such secure channel protocols based on three
different wireless communication deployment approaches.
These selected protocols are then analysed for their suitabil-
ity from performance and security point of view for AWN
deployment.
1.1. Contribution
In this paper, our main focus is on the security and
performance analysis of different secure channel protocols
for AWNs. Our salient contributions are the following:
1) selection of seven secure channel protocols based
on three different setup approaches (pre-shared keys,
trusted key distribution, and key sharing protocols);
2) definition of criteria to compare these secure channel
protocols along with the related security and perfor-
mance analysis;
3) implementation of these protocols in a AWN test-bed
based on off-the-shelve hardware, so as to be able to
make measurements.
1.2. Structure of the Paper
Section 2 briefly presents the generic architecture of
Aircraft Data Networks, which constitutes a rationale for
considering the benefits of using Wireless Networks. Sec-
tion 3 discusses different AWN formats and the need for
secure channel protocols and proposes a case study in which
the secure channel protocols presented in section 5 may
take place. Section 4 introduces the studied secure channel
deployment scenarios. Section 5 provides the results of the
evaluation of several secure channel protocols in a AWN
test-bed. Section 6 compares them based on the obtained
results according to the defined security and performance
criteria. In section 7 we provide a summary of our experi-
ments.
2. Aircraft Data Networks
In this section, we discuss the traditional deployment of
a wired network (ADN) in an aircraft. We conclude with a
short list of benefits that would result from replacing some
non-critical functions of ADN with wireless technology.
2.1. Generic Architecture
A modern aircraft network consists of several data net-
works, including flight-control and/or crew network (fig-
ure 1), and passengers (entertainment) network (figure 2).
Flight-control and/or crew networks consist of a multi-
tude of sub-systems interconnected using wired technology
as shown in figure 1. These different avionics sub-systems
are connected with end systems that are then interconnected
by means of a backbone network using several commu-
nication standards like ARINC 429 [5], ARINC 825 [2]
or AFDX (ARINC 664 Aircraft Data Network, Part 7)
[3, 6]. Each arrow in the figure 1 represents a logical
communication link that physically consists of two wires
connecting these devices via different paths (dissimilar path
redundancy).
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Figure 1. Generic Aircraft (Flight-Control and/or Crew) Data Network with
AFDX as an Example
For some specific sub-systems, there are sets of sensors
and actuators connected on Controller Area Network (CAN)
[7] or ARINC 429 buses for flight control systems [8].
The AFDX or a similar technology is used to intercon-
nect time- and safety-critical sub-systems like environmental
control, doors and other utility systems. The AFDX back-
bone also connects less critical sub-systems like displays
providing safety information to passengers, but includes
oxygen masks, oxygen flow and audio announcement trig-
gers, and it manages the quality of service accordingly.
As shown in figure 2, the entertainment network can be
supported using standard Ethernet technology – it is not a
high reliability- and safety-critical network.
Cabin Management
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Figure 2. Generic Aircraft (Cabin) Data Network
The type and nature of the network configuration is
dependent on the deployment scenario and objectives. How-
ever, there is a possibility that the flight control network,
crew network and passenger (entertainment) network are all
supported by the same wired technology, requiring imple-
mentation of network segregation by either physical separa-
tion of networks or by stringent firewalls, robust gateways
and security policies [9].
2.2. Benefits of Wireless Networks
Whatever the network deployment topology and the
communication technology used, one common element re-
mains: the physical wire that connects two or more avionics
sub-systems. Wiring an aircraft can be costly in that it
includes wiring harness designs, cable fabrication and the
associated exploitation cost due to the resulting additional
weight. Furthermore, to provide dual redundancy these wires
have to connect any two devices via two physically separated
paths in the aircraft. Potentially, the wires and the related
connectors represent 2-5 percent of an aircraft’s weight
[10]. The design of the wiring route is heavily dependent
on wiring harness design that has to satisfy the challenge
of providing separate routing paths for redundant wiring.
As the wiring of an aircraft is a time- and labor-intensive
activity, post-deployment upgrades or installation of new
wire routes or avionics sub-systems can be very expensive
[11]. As reported by [10], roughly 30 percent of wires
are potential candidates for wireless substitutes. Therefore,
as highlighted in [12], wireless solutions have reasonable
prospects as long as security, safety and high levels of
reliability can be maintained.
3. Avionics Wireless Network
Referring to [12], an AWN is defined as an aircraft
network inter-connecting its different components using
wireless technology instead of physical wires. Based on this
definition, AWNs have been classified into four overlapping
deployment architectures [12]:
1) Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN): A WSN is a set
of intelligent and autonomous systems that can sense
physical or environmental conditions and/or act on
them. Usually WSN nodes record the designated data
and transfer them via a wireless medium to some dedi-
cated nodes (so-called sinks) that act as gateways (as in
a wireless mesh network) between the WSN and a third
party system, to which the connection can be wired. As
some related work has mentioned, such networks are
particularly useful in aircraft design [13, 14], especially
to monitor moving and/or rotating parts (for example,
the landing gear [10] or the engine itself [15]). A WSN
can also be useful as an independent network (i.e. not
connected to the aircraft network) simply to collect and
store flight-related data; for instance, to improve the
efficiency of an on-ground maintenance crew [16].
2) Dissimilar Redundancy Network (DRN): Since air-
craft networks must be fault-tolerant, wireless links can
be used to build dissimilar redundant networks; this
would lower the probability of a potential common
mode failure in networks based on the same wired tech-
nology. In addition, it decreases the difficulty of routing
the wires - as much as possible, and as permitted by the
aircraft geometry - using physically disjoint paths. Re-
lated work has identified that dissimilar network tech-
nologies can provide redundancy, which might enhance
the overall reliability [17] in some critical situations
compared to “identical redundancy” [18].
3) Inflight Entertainment Network (IFE): Since it is
one of the least critical networks on board an aircraft,
the Ethernet switch of the IFE depicted in figure 2 can
be replaced by a wireless access point as described
by [19], to offer more custom services without decreas-
ing the overall safety of the aircraft.
4) Wireless as a Comm-Link: In this type of AWN,
wireless communication links replace the wired links
between avionics computing modules as shown in
Figure 3. The protocols and the network architecture
above the data link layer can remain the same, but
at the physical layer, the data is communicated via
a wireless medium rather than a wired medium. This
type of network can be considered as a partial or a full
deployment. In a partial deployment, out of two re-
dundant wired links between aircraft sub-systems only
one is replaced by a wireless link. In a full deployment
both wired links between the aircraft sub-systems are
replaced by wireless links.
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Figure 3. Generic Representation of Wireless as a Comm-Link
3.1. Related Work on Security Concerns
Security and trust have also been subject to analysis
by both the academic community and the industry. A brief
overview of aircraft information security and some improve-
ments were proposed in [16]. Security assurance research,
from airplane production up to operation, was presented in
[20, 21]. A general discussion on the security issues related
to the aircraft network and aircrafts’ internet connectivity is
discussed in [22], while [1, 9] discuss the impact of WSNs
deployed in aircraft and related security concerns. Security
and safety are intrinsically related to each other in general
and especially in the context of the aviation industry [23]–
[25]. The application and impact of cryptography, and es-
pecially the impact of public key cryptography for avionics
networks, was evaluated in [26].
Security and the general deployment of AWNs based on
wireless-as-a-comm-link have been analyzed in [12], which
discusses the security and trust challenges faced by AWNs.
Beside this, a crucial component of the security of aircraft
devices is the trusted boot process discussed in [27]. The
security, trust and assurance issues related to bringing a user
device into an aircraft network are evaluated in [28].
3.2. AWN Case Study
When considering the four deployment models discussed
above for a wireless technology as part of an aircraft net-
work, one thing is common: all of these options rely on
data being transmitted over the air. This potentially makes
it easier for an adversary to eavesdrop and/or modify the
transmitted pieces of information. To prevent such even-
tualities, strong cryptography constructs are deployed to
create a secure channel. A secure communication channel is
encrypted with a key known only by the communicating en-
tities. From an attacker’s perspective he/she can still observe
the encrypted messages but these should not give him/her
any knowledge about the contents of the communication.
Regarding the modification of messages, an attacker can
modify them but the results (decrypted form of the trans-
mitted message) would potentially not be in his/her control
– because he/she does not know the key used to encrypt the
message. However, if a strong integrity mechanism is used
to secure the channel, any modification would be detected.
Having secure channels for AWN communication is
essential. To achieve this, an AWN has to run a secure
channel protocol that would result in communicating entities
being authenticated, and it also has to generate secure keys
that would be used for encrypting the communications. For
this reason, regardless of what type of AWN is chosen, it
is necessary to set up a secure channel (to enable secure
communication), which is the sole focus of this paper: our
goal is to evaluate the security and performance of different
secure channel protocols. We note that although wireless
jamming and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks are valid and
real concerns for AWNs we do not investigate them here
and countermeasures to cope with such attacks are beyond
the scope of this paper.
4. Secure Channel Deployment Scenarios
In this section, we discuss the three deployment scenar-
ios that we have defined for the establishment of secure
channels in AWNs. Even though these scenarios might
not be exhaustive, we believe that they are representative.
Wireless communication itself can be deployed either in
Access Point (AP) or ad-hoc modes. In this section, we
are not concerned with AP and/or ad-hoc modes but with
the nature of the key sharing mechanism, the supporting
architecture, what is known prior to the execution of the
protocol, and the execution of the secure channel protocols
themselves. The issues of security and reliability directly
related to the AP and the AP/ad-hoc modes are beyond the
scope of this paper.
4.1. Pre-Shared Keys
In this scenario, all communicating nodes in an AWN
share a symmetric key that is provided either by their manu-
facturer or by the entity that deploys/configures them. This
pre-shared key scenario can be achieved in two different
ways. In the first method all the nodes have the same key to
encrypt all the messages that they exchange with the other
entities. In the second method, the pre-shared key is not used
to directly encrypt the messages but to generate a session
key. In this scenario the pre-shared key is referred to as the
“master key” and a pre-defined algorithm is used to generate
session keys.
4.2. Trusted Key Distribution Frameworks (TKDF)
In this scenario, all the nodes in the AWN trust a single
entity that is responsible for generating and distributing the
session keys that they will use to encrypt their messages.
Such an entity is referred as a Trusted Key Distribution
Server (TKDS) and all the nodes in the network have to
communicate with it. Since not all nodes of the AWN
might be in wireless communication range of the TKDS,
they thus have to rely on neighboring nodes or on wireless
range extenders (relay nodes). Each node in the AWN and
the TKDS initially shares a secret key (either a symmetric
or asymmetric key) and these keys are used to secure the
communication between each of the nodes and the TKDS.
4.3. Key Sharing On Demand
In this scenario, each individual node executes a se-
cure channel protocol with its communicating peers in the
network. The aim of this protocol is to authenticate the
nodes with each other and to create session keys. For this
deployment scenario, no prior sharing of keys is required as
the session keys are computed during the execution of the
protocol. For entity authentication, some prior knowledge
of communicating partners is essential. This is required
to successfully authenticate the entities. The process of
authentication does not influence the key generation/sharing
process in a protocol.
5. Establishing Secure Wireless Connections
The performance of several secure channel protocols has
been measured over a wireless comm-link in a AWN test-
bed. The results are presented in this section.
5.1. Selected Protocols
Seven different protocols have been considered to es-
tablish secure channels over the wireless comm-link of the
AWN test-bed. They can be gathered in three different
families: secure channels based on pre-shared keys; secure
channels based on Trusted Key Distribution Frameworks
(TKDFs); and secure channels based on key sharing pro-
tocols, as discussed in section 4.
For secure channels based on pre-shared keys, Wired
Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wi-Fi Protected Access Pre-
Shared Key (WPA-PSK) and IPSec have been selected.
When using WEP, each node has a fixed pre-shared key
used to encrypt the data frames using RC4. With WPA-PSK,
each node has a pre-shared master key that is used to build
session keys during the authentication phase. Compared to
the two previous secure channel protocols, IPSec encryption
(with fixed pre-shared keys in our experiments) is achieved
at the level of layer 3 (i.e. network) of the OSI protocol stack
instead of layer 2 (i.e. data link) for WEP and WPA-PSK.
For secure channels based on TKDFs, two ad-hoc frame-
works were developed. The authentication and key dis-
tribution phase is based on symmetric keys for the first
framework whereas it is based on asymmetric keys for the
second framework. In a symmetric key-based TKDF, each
node shares a symmetric key with a trusted key distribution
server, which uses it to send the session key encrypted with
the shared key associated with each communicating node.
Then each node decrypts it to use the key to finalize the
establishment of the secure channel. For our experiments,
the fixed version of the Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key
Protocol, which is the basis of Kerberos, was implemented
using AES as the symmetric encryption algorithm.
In an asymmetric key-based TKDF, each node shares
a public key with a trusted key distribution server, which
uses it to send encrypted session keys that the target node
deciphers with its private key. For our experiments, the fixed
version of the Needham-Schroeder (so-called Needham-
Schroeder–Lowe) public Key Protocol was implemented
using RSA as the public key algorithm. In both TKDFs,
the distributed session keys are symmetric keys used by the
parties to communicate in the network. In our implementa-
tions, AES was used as the channel encryption algorithm.
For the secure channels based on key sharing protocols,
SSH and SSL were selected.
5.2. Comparison Criteria
For a protocol to support the AWN framework, it should
meet, at minimum, the security and operational requirements
listed below:
G1) Mutual Entity Authentication: All nodes in the net-
work should be able to authenticate with each other so
as to avoid masquerading by a malicious entity.
G2) Asymmetric Architecture: Certified public keys
should be exchanged between the entities to facilitate
the key generation and entity authentication process.
G3) Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties
should agree on the generation of a key during the
execution of the protocol.
G4) Joint Key Control: Communicating parties should mu-
tually control the generation of new keys to prevent one
party from choosing weak keys or predetermining any
portion of the session key.
G5) Key Freshness: The generated key should be fresh with
regards to the protocol session to prevent replay attacks.
G6) Mutual Key Confirmation: The communicating parties
should provide implicit or explicit confirmation that
they have generated the same keys during a run of the
protocol.
G7) Known-Key Security: Should a malicious user obtain
the session key of a particular protocol run, he/she
should not be able to retrieve long-term secrets (private
keys) or session keys (future and past).
G8) Unknown Key Share Resilience: In the event of an
unknown key share attack, an entity X believes that it
has shared a key with Y , where the entity Y mistakenly
believes that it has shared the key with entity Z 6=
X . The proposed protocols should adequately protect
against this kind of attack.
G9) Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Resilience:
If a malicious user retrieves the long-term key of an
entity Y , it will enable him to impersonate Y . Never-
theless, compromising the key should not enable him
to impersonate other entities [29].
G10) Perfect Forward Secrecy: If the long-term keys of
communicating entities are compromised, this should
not enable a malicious user to compromise previously
generated session keys.
G11) Mutual Non-Repudiation: The communicating entities
will not be able to deny that they have executed a
protocol run with each other.
G12) Partial Chosen Key (PCK) Attack Resilience: Pro-
tocols that claim to provide joint key control are sus-
ceptible to this type of attack [30]. In this type of
attack, if two entities provide separate values to the key
generation function then one entity has to communicate
its contribution value to the other. The second entity
can then compute the value of its contribution in such
a way that it can dictate its strength (i.e. it is able
to generate a partially weak key). This attack depends
upon the computational capabilities of the second en-
tity. The proposed protocols should adequately prevent
PCK attack.
G13) Privacy: A third party should not be able to know the
identities of the AWN nodes.
For a formal definition of the (italicized) terms used in
the above list, the reader is referred to [31]. The require-
ments listed above are used below as a point of reference
to compare the selected protocols in Table 1.
For the performance evaluation that we have conducted,
the main measurements are related to the time required to
establish a secure channel once the wireless link is estab-
lished (or to establish the secure wireless link for protocols
like WEP and WPA-PSK operating at the level of the data
link layer). The properties of the keys (e.g. type of keys,
key size, and freshness) will be discussed with regards to
the performance results.
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Figure 4. AWN test-bed
5.3. Test-Bed for Performance Evaluation
In our AWN test-bed each node is a Raspberry Pi model
B supplied with a Wi-Fi USB dongle TL-WN722N by TP-
LINK. In all our measurements, the nodes were configured
in ad-hoc mode.
For all the selected protocols, in our evaluation im-
plementations, only 2 nodes establish a secure channel.
However, for the TKDF, a key distribution server is also
required and a third node in the ad-hoc network plays this
role.
In our AWN test-bed, each node is connected to a
backend server by means of an Ethernet connection. This
server controls the nodes so as to prepare them for the target
scenario and is also in charge of collecting the measure-
ments. Effective measurement can be done internally on the
node initiating the secure channel, called a client, or at the
level of the network data exchanged between the nodes of
the AWN and captured with a Wi-Fi card on the backend
server set in monitor mode.
6. Security and Performance Analysis
In this section, we present the security analysis of the
selected protocols based on the goals stated above; it is
followed by the performance analysis of these protocols.
We conclude the section with an overall analysis and with
a discussion of some future research directions.
6.1. Security Analysis
Before discussing the analysis of the security goals as
met by each protocol presented in Table 1, it is worth noting
that several of them can be configured in several manners
that may change the way they satisfy the goals and may also
change their performance. For instance, we decided to use
IPSec with fixed pre-shared keys. This choice is not one that
can satisfy the maximum number of goals but this solution
is more suitable for resource-constrained wireless nodes.
However, Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol could have
been used and then IPSec would have met additional goals.
When comparing the selected protocols, taking into ac-
count the above remark, it is interesting to note that the
protocols based on asymmetric cryptosystems are those that
meet most of the goals. However, these solutions are known
to be costly in terms of time and resource consumption, as
confirmed by the performance measurements presented in
the following section. The secure channel protocols acting in
the low level layers of the OSI stack, like WEP, WPA-PSK
(layer 2), or even IPSec (layer 3), fail to satisfy several goals,
which is surprising because, usually, security solutions pro-
vided at low levels are more generic; they might be expected
to ensure better security than solutions working at higher
levels. Solutions at these levels that establish more secure
channels do exist (e.g. 802.1X and RADIUS server at level
2, IPSec and PKI) but they are not applicable to resource-
constrained wireless nodes. Thus, among our selected proto-
cols, solutions that establish secure channels at higher levels
(SSH or SSL operate respectively at levels 7 and 5-7) and/or
that rely on a server (symmetric and asymmetric TKDF)
satisfy more goals. However these solutions are too costly:
either they are based on asymmetric cryptosystems (which
are costly in terms of resources) or they need a server that
is costly in terms of bandwidth, latency and delay.
6.2. Performance Analysis
The practical results obtained on our AWN test-bed
confirm the theoretical analysis: asymmetric cryptosystems
Table 1. PROTOCOLS COMPARISON ON THE BASIS OF THE STATED
GOALS (SEE SECTION 5.2.)
Goals ProtocolsWEP WPA-PSK IPSec Symmetric TKDF Asymmetric TKDF SSH SSL
G1. −∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗ (∗) ∗
G2. × × × × ∗ ∗ ∗
G3. × −∗ × −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗
G4. × −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ (∗) (∗)
G5. × ∗ × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G6. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G7. × ∗ × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G8. −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ −∗ ∗ ∗
G9. × × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G10. × × × ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G11. × × × × ∗ ∗ ∗
G12. ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
G13. −∗ −∗ −∗ (∗) (∗) (∗) (∗)
Note: ∗ means that the protocol meets the stated goal, (∗) shows that
the protocol meets the requirement in certain conditions, × shows that
the protocol cannot meet the stated goal and −∗ means that the protocol
(implicitly) meets the requirement, not because of the protocol messages
but because of the prior relationship between the communicating entities.
are costly and solutions relying on a third party (TKDFs)
are even more costly. To be fair, it is important to note
that we implemented the two TKDF protocols ourselves
whereas the implementations of other tested protocols were
done by groups of professional developers. Thus our imple-
mentations may be optimized, but not to the point where
this would change the results by a significant factor. In
addition, it can be noted that SSL and SSH operate over
a TCP connection, which is more time consuming for the
establishment of communication than our implementations
of TKDF, which operate over UDP to improve performance
(at the expense of the reliability of the connection).
The good performance of WEP and WPA-PSK are re-
lated to the fact that the protocols are run by the dedicated
hardware and firmware of the Wi-Fi card - optimized for the
execution of these protocols. The good results for IPSec are
also related to the use of optimized hardware on the Wi-Fi
card to execute this protocol - as it is an important protocol
for Internet communication.
Table 2. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON OF SELECTED SECURE CHANNEL
PROTOCOLS.
Protocol Key type Key size (bits) Establishment (ms)
WEP RC4 128 2.42
WPA AES 128 2.55
IPSec AES 256 2.67
Symmetric TKDF AES 256 5092.88
Asymmetric TKDF RSA 2048 14447.63
SSH RSA 2048 911.21
SSL RSA 2048 1310.93
Note that in WEP and WPA-PSK in ad-hoc mode, the
packet loss was very important, respectively around 50%
and 70%. WPA-PSK in AP mode needs the same time to
establish the secure channel but the rate of packet lost was
only 20%. For IPSec in ad-hoc mode, which encrypts at
layer 3 over a plain text channel at layer 2, the rate of packet
loss was 0%. Thus, as mentioned in the next section, the
connection mode and the layer at which the secure channel
should be established are parameters that should be studied
in future work.
6.3. Overall Analysis and Future Research Direc-
tions
It appears that the selected protocols (all state-of-the-
art in computer science security) are too generic, i.e. not
specifically tailored for the target applications, or do not
offer acceptable performance. Therefore, as part of our
future research, we are currently experimenting with:
• A new secure and trusted channel protocol that
meets all the stated requirements, moving away from
large API (Application Programming Interface) based
protocols like SSL and IPSec that might introduce
implementation-related vulnerabilities.
• Security and reliability of AP and ad-hoc modes in
different AWN deployment contexts.
Additionally, we are exploring the following directions:
• Countering wireless jamming and DoS attacks.
• Secure execution on nodes using ARM TrustZone and
Intel SGX.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the nature of ADN
and how AWNs might provide a valid alternative to wired
networks. Any communication that uses a wireless medium
has the inherent issue that an attacker can easily access this
physical communication link. This can enable the attacker to
eavesdrop and/or modify the contents of messages. To avoid
this, secure channels are essential to encrypt all messages.
For this encryption to be secure and robust, the keys that are
used need to be not only secure but also to meet additional
security requirements. In this paper, we listed thirteen secu-
rity goals that we believe any secure channel protocol should
meet. Subsequently, we selected seven different secure chan-
nel protocols (representative examples from three different
wireless deployment scenarios). We developed a test-bed to
evaluate their performance. We then compared the seven
selected protocols in terms of security and performance.
There is no doubt that extensive work is still required
before an AWN can be deployed in an aircraft environment
and there are many challenges to overcome. However, in
this paper we provide security comparisons and experimen-
tal performance data that we believe will be useful for
someone wanting to deploy an AWN to enable them to
make an informed decision about which features/protocols
meet their unique environment and requirements. This paper
contributes to the work that needs to be done to make AWNs
a robust and secure proposal.
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